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During the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in research examining the role of memory in
imagination and future thinking. This work has revealed striking similarities between remembering the past
and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a common brain network underlies both
memory and imagination. Here, we discuss a number of key points that have emerged during recent years,
focusing in particular on the importance of distinguishing between temporal and nontemporal factors in anal-
yses of memory and imagination, the nature of differences between remembering the past and imagining the
future, the identification of component processes that comprise the default network supporting memory-
based simulations, and the finding that this network can couple flexibly with other networks to support
complex goal-directed simulations. This growing area of research has broadened our conception of memory
by highlighting the many ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning.Introduction
During the past century, memory research has focused on
a variety of key issues and topics that can be said to constitute
the conceptual core of the field. According to a recent volume
devoted to delineating core concepts in memory research (Roe-
diger et al., 2007), they include encoding, consolidation,
retrieval, forgetting, plasticity, transfer, context, and memory
systems, among others. In 2007, several articles appeared that
examined a topic—the role of memory in imagination and future
thinking—that was nowhere to be found in the comprehensive
volume published by Roediger et al. during that same year.
Two of these articles combined functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) with novel behavioral methods to reveal striking
overlap in the brain activity associated with remembering actual
past experiences and imagining or simulating possible future
experiences (Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). Compa-
rable levels of activity were observed during both remembering
and imagining in regions including medial temporal and frontal
lobes, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, and lateral
parietal and temporal areas.
These studies suggested that a common ‘‘core’’ network that
includes the above-mentioned regions, commonly referred to as
the default network (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001), underlies both
remembering and imagining (Buckner and Carroll, 2007;
Schacter et al., 2007a). In a related vein, an investigation of
amnesic patients with hippocampal damage revealed significant
impairments when these patients were asked to imagine novel
experiences (Hassabis et al., 2007b). These empirical studies
were accompanied by review and theoretical papers that
emphasized the links among remembering the past, imagining
the future, and engaging in related forms of mental simulation
(Bar, 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Gilbert and Wilson,
2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter and Addis,2007a, 2007b; Schacter et al., 2007a). At the close of 2007,
Science included the aforementioned neuroimaging and neuro-
psychological studies of memory and imagination on their list
of the top ten discoveries of the year (Science, 21 December,
2007, pp. 1848–1849).
Although research concerning the role of memory in imagina-
tion and future thinking seemed to burst on the scientific scene in
2007, a variety of earlier articles had in fact already laid some of
the conceptual and empirical foundations for this work. Evidence
that amnesic patients have problems imagining the future was
first reported by Tulving (1985) and later by Klein et al. (2002).
In a positron emission tomography (PET) study, Okuda et al.
(2003) asked participants to think about past and future events,
and observed considerable overlap in the activated brain
regions. Similarities between remembering past events and
imagining future events had also been documented in a study
of depressed patients (Williams et al., 1996) as well as in behav-
ioral studies of healthy individuals (e.g., D’Argembeau and Van
der Linden, 2004, 2006; Spreng and Levine, 2006; Suddendorf
and Busby, 2005), and were explored in experiments that inves-
tigated whether non-human animals can project into the past or
future (e.g., Clayton and Dickinson, 1998; Emery and Clayton,
2001). Social psychologists had published studies concerning
the role of mental simulations in predicting future experiences
and the role of memory in guiding such simulations (e.g., More-
wedge et al., 2005). Moreover, several review papers had dis-
cussed relevant theoretical and conceptual issues (Atance and
O’Neill, 2001, 2005; Clayton et al., 2003; Ingvar, 1979, 1985;
Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1985, 2002a, 2002b,
2005; Wheeler et al., 1997). Building on these foundational
studies and analyses, the papers published in 2007 served to
galvanize scientific interest in the relations between remem-
bering the past and imagining the future, as evidenced by theNeuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 677
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published since.
The main purpose of the present article is to review some of
the progress that has been made since 2007 (our review will
focus exclusively on studies with human subjects, but relevant
recent work has also been conducted with nonhuman animals;
for reviews, see Cheke and Clayton, 2010; Crystal, 2012; Rob-
erts, 2012; van der Meer et al., 2012). Specifically, we have orga-
nized the literature with respect to four key points that have
emerged from research reported during the past five years: (1)
it is important to distinguish between temporal and nontemporal
factors when conceptualizing processes involved in remem-
bering the past and imagining the future; (2) despite impressive
similarities between remembering the past and imagining the
future, theoretically important differences have also emerged;
(3) the component processes that comprise the default network
supporting memory-based simulations are beginning to be iden-
tified; and (4) this network can couple flexibly with other networks
to support complex goal-directed simulations. We will conclude
by considering briefly several other emerging points that will be
important to expand on in future research.
Note that although the focus of our review will be to elucidate
recent advances in understanding the neural mechanisms of
memory-based simulations, numerous purely behavioral studies
have also shed light on the topic and we will consider those data
where appropriate. Throughout the review, we will use the
concepts of imagination or ‘‘imagining the future’’ and simulation
or ‘‘simulating the future’’ in a roughly interchangeable manner.
Schacter et al. (2008; p. 42), following Taylor and Schneider
(1989), defined future simulations as imaginative constructions
of hypothetical events or scenarios, and we will adopt this usage
in the present review. Further, most of the reviewwill focus on the
contributions of episodic memory—memory for specific
happenings in one’s personal past (Tulving, 1983, 2002a)—but
we will conclude by discussing the contribution of semantic
memory (i.e., general knowledge) to imagination and future
thinking.
Understanding the Relation between Remembering the
Past and Imagining the Future Requires Distinguishing
between Temporal and Nontemporal Factors
As noted earlier, one of the findings responsible for the upsurge
of interest in the relation between remembering the past and
imagining the future comes from functional neuroimaging
studies that revealed activation of a common brain network
during these two forms of mental activity. On the basis of this
observation, Okuda et al. (2003) concluded that ‘‘thinking of
the future is closely related to retrospective memory’’ (p. 1369);
Addis et al. (2007, p. 1363) stated that ‘‘this striking neural over-
lap. confirms that the episodic system contributes importantly
to imagining the future’’; and Szpunar et al. (2007, p.642)
observed that ‘‘our results offer insight into the fundamental
and little-studied capacity of vivid mental projection of oneself
in the future.’’
These conclusions seem straightforward enough given that
overlap in brain activity was observed when people remembered
past events or imagined future events. And those conclusions fit
nicely with the idea that the ability to project oneself into the past678 Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.and future reflects a capacity for ‘‘mental time travel’’ (Sudden-
dorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Tulving, 1983, 2002a, 2005).
However, as noted by Addis et al. (2009a), the distinction
between ‘‘past events’’ and ‘‘future events’’ in these studies is
confounded with the distinction between ‘‘remembering’’ and
‘‘imagining.’’ While remembered events must refer to the past,
activity attributed to ‘‘future events’’ could just as well be attrib-
uted to ‘‘imagined events,’’ irrespective of whether those events
refer to the future, the past, or the present (Hassabis and Ma-
guire, 2009). These considerations raise the question of whether
experiments that examine the relation between remembering the
past and imagining the future specifically inform our under-
standing of the relation between past and future, as claimed in
the aforementioned studies, or whether they bear on our under-
standing of the relation between memory and imagination, irre-
spective of the involvement of mental time travel.
Evidence for a Nontemporal Perspective
Several kinds of observations favor a nontemporal perspective.
For example, Buckner and Carroll (2007) pointed out that activa-
tion of default network regions is observed not only when individ-
uals remember the past and imagine the future, but also when
they engage in related forms of mental simulation that involve
taking the perspective of others (without an explicit requirement
for mental time travel), and also during spatial navigation (see
Spreng et al., 2009). Similarly, Hassabis et al. (2007a) reported
activation of several default network regions in an fMRI study
in which participants were instructed to imagine novel scenes,
without a specific requirement for mental time travel into the
future. Hassabis et al. (2007b) reported deficits on the same
task in amnesic patients with medial temporal lobe damage,
and Romero and Moscovitch (2012) have recently reported
that such patients exhibit deficits on a related task involving
construction of a novel event from word cues, without an explicit
requirement for mental time travel. Addis et al. (2009a) found
nearly identical patterns of default network activity when individ-
uals were asked to imagine events that might occur in the future
or might have occurred in the past (see Figure 1), suggesting that
previous observations of default network activity during imag-
ining the future are not specifically associated with the prospec-
tive components of the task.
de Vito et al. (2012a) reported behavioral evidence favoring
a nontemporal perspective. They asked participants to imagine
themselves carrying out specific future activities in familiar or
unfamiliar settings or to imagine themselves carrying out activi-
ties in familiar settings with no reference to a particular time.
Participants described each imagined episode, and the experi-
menters recorded and later transcribed these protocols. Partic-
ipants provided subjective ratings concerning the clarity and
vividness of the imagined episodes, and the experimenters per-
formed objective ratings concerning the amount of detail repre-
sented in the protocols that participants provided. To accom-
plish this latter objective, the experimenters used a scoring
procedure known as the Autobiographical Interview (Levine
et al., 2002) that distinguishes between ‘‘internal’’ or episodic
details present in a protocol (e.g., details concerning people,
locations, and actions) and ‘‘external’’ or semantic details (e.g.,
facts and evaluative comments). Participants’ subjective ratings
revealed greater vividness for future episodes that were
Figure 1. A Subsystem of Brain Regions Is
More Active When Participants Imagine
Events in Either the Past or Future, Relative
to When They Remember Real Past Events
or Complete a Control Task
The regions in which activation is associated with
the past and future imagine tasks (warm colors) or
control and past-recall tasks (cool colors) are
shown 8–10 s after trial onset, superimposed over
a standard MRI template at a threshold of p <
0.001. The line graph illustrates the weighted
average of activation across all voxels associated
with a particular condition across the length of the
experimental tasks. Adapted from Addis et al.
(2009a).
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replicating earlier results (Arnold et al., 2011a; Szpunar and
McDermott, 2008), and objective data from the Autobiographical
Interview showed significantly more internal details for episodes
imagined in familiar than unfamiliar settings. By contrast, there
were no differences between future episodes and atemporal
episodes on either the subjective or objective measures. A
second experiment revealed that imagined future events that
are relevant to the self were associated with a stronger subjec-
tive ‘‘feeling of experiencing’’ than imagined future events that
were not relevant to the self and that self-relevant events con-
tained more internal details than self-irrelevant episodes. But
future self-relevant and atemporal self-relevant events did not
differ on either of these measures. Thus, there was no evidence
for differences between future and atemporal events on subjec-
tive and objective measures that were sensitive enough to reveal
differences between familiar versus unfamiliar settings and self-
relevant versus self-irrelevant events.
Evidence for a Temporal Perspective
The foregoing results are consistent with the idea that future and
atemporal imagined events are represented similarly, but other
recent data indicate differences between temporal and atem-
poral imagined scenarios. For example, de Vito et al. (2012b)
report that patients with Parkinson’s disease exhibit deficits
when asked to imagine future events, but perform normally
when asked to imagine atemporal scenarios. Rendell et al.
(2012), using a task based on previous work by Hassabis et al.
(2007a, 2007b), found that older adults exhibited deficits when
imagining future and atemporal scenarios compared with
younger adults, but showed a significantly greater impairment
for the future than the atemporal scenarios. Klein et al. (2010)
demonstrated that encoding of new information benefits from
creating imagined scenarios that involve planning for the future,
but the same encoding benefit is not observed when people
encode information by calling up past scenarios or imagining
atemporal scenarios. Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) reported
fMRI evidence that distinct regions within the default network
were associated with imagining future scenarios involving
oneself versus reflecting about oneself in the present. However,
it is not clear that this contrast specifically isolated temporal
factors, because as noted by the authors, the future and presentconditions differed in other ways (e.g., greater use of mental
imagery in the future self condition).
Another recent fMRI study examined the neural basis of chron-
esthesia, or the capacity to be aware of subjective time (Tulving,
2002b; for related ideas, see Dalla Barba and Boisse´, 2010;
Szpunar, 2011). Chronesthesia is invoked whenever people
remember the past or imagine the future, but isolating the cogni-
tive processes or brain regions associated with chronesthesia
requires an experimental design that controls for nontemporal
cognitive activities. That is, an appropriate experimental para-
digm should contrast tasks that involve chronesthesia (e.g.,
remembering the past, imagining the future) with a task that is
matched to the past and future tasks on nontemporal features,
such as imagining oneself interacting with people and locations,
without requiring ‘‘movement’’ in subjective time. Nyberg et al.
(2010) scanned participants using fMRI during experimental
tasks that, they contended, require chronesthesia—remem-
bering a recent short walk along a familiar route or imagining
a future short walk along the same route. Brain activity during
these tasks was compared with activity during a matched task
that, according to the authors, does not require chronesthesia:
participants were instructed to take a mental walk through the
same route in the present moment, without any thoughts about
specific personal past or future happenings. Participants were
given extensive training in performing the key tasks and the
authors tried to equate the tasks for mental contents—they
took place in the same setting and did not involve interactions
with other people—in an attempt to isolate brain activity associ-
ated with chronesthesia by contrasting the remembering and
imagining tasks with the mental walk task. Nyberg et al. (2010)
reported that left lateral parietal cortex, as well as left frontal
cortex, cerebellum, and thalamus were preferentially engaged
as participants thought about taking walks in the past or future
as compared to taking the same walk in the present moment.
By contrast, many default network regions that had shown
increased activity during remembering the past and imagining
the future in previous studies (e.g., medial temporal lobe, medial
prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial cortex) did not show preferential
activation when thinking about taking walks in the past and
future tasks as compared with the present moment. Although
interpretation of these findings depends critically on the extentNeuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 679
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remain in the present moment during the mental walk task, they
suggest that only some regions are specifically related to chron-
esthesia or mental time travel (for related evidence, see Arzy
et al., 2008, 2009).
Further highlighting a possible role for temporal factors, recent
behavioral studies have revealed individual differences in the
feeling of experiencing simulations of future events (Arnold
et al., 2011b; D’Argembeau et al., 2010a; Quoidbach et al.,
2008) along with asymmetries in the way that people think about
the past and the future. For instance, Van Boven and Caruso and
their colleagues have shown that people experience more
intense emotions when they anticipate future experiences than
when they retrospect about past experiences, either actual or
hypothetical (Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 2008; Van Boven
and Ashworth, 2007). Nonetheless, an in depth understanding
of the brain bases of subjective experiences associated with
mental time travel awaits future research.
Taken together with the studies considered earlier in this
section, we conclude that studies of remembering the past
and imagining the future can potentially inform our under-
standing of the relation between memory and imagination, inde-
pendent of temporal factors (cf., Eacott and Easton, 2012), but
can also inform our understanding of mental time travel or chron-
esthesia, when possible differences betweenmemory and imag-
ination are held constant. However, distinguishing between
these factors requires careful experimental designs that
precisely target specific processes of interest. Simple compari-
sons between remembering the past and imagining the future
cannot alone disentangle the contributions of temporal and
non-temporal factors.
Despite Impressive Similarities between Remembering
the Past and Imagining the Future, Theoretically
Important Differences Are Beginning to Emerge
Neural and Cognitive Similarities: A Brief Summary
As noted earlier, neuroimaging studies have revealed that when
people remember the past or imagine the future, similar levels of
activation are observed in regions including medial temporal and
frontal lobes, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, and
lateral parietal and temporal areas (Addis et al., 2007, 2009a,
2011b; Botzung et al., 2008; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Okuda
et al., 2003; Schacter et al., 2007a; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng
and Grady, 2010; Szpunar et al., 2007; Szpunar, 2010; Viard
et al., 2011). We also noted that these regions overlap substan-
tially with the default network (Raichle et al., 2001; for reviews,
see Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna, 2012), which was first
identified in neuroimaging studies on the basis of activation
increases in the above-noted brain regions for experimental
participants in passive rest conditions compared with the exper-
imental conditions of principal interest in which they performed
attention demanding or goal-directed cognitive tasks (Raichle
et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). Given recent studies showing
default network activity when people remember the past or
imagine the future, it now seems likely that during passive rest
conditions in earlier studies, participants were engaged in
remembering past experiences or imagining future experiences.
Indeed, thought-sampling experiments have revealed that680 Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.participants report frequent thoughts about past and future
events during rest blocks (Andreasen et al., 1995; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010a; Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
Consistent with the finding that both remembering and imag-
ining are associated with activity in the default network, many
studies have demonstrated that the cognitive processes associ-
ated with memory and simulation show commonalities. For
example, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004; see also Ar-
nold et al., 2011a; D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Trope and Liber-
man, 2003) reported that positive events were associated with
increased subjective ratings of re-experiencing for past events
and ‘‘pre-experiencing’’ for future events. They also found that
temporally close events in either the past or the future included
more sensory and contextual details, and greater feelings of
re-experiencing and pre-experiencing, than did temporally
distant events. D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006) showed
that individual differences in imagery ability and emotion regula-
tion strategies have similar effects on both past and future
events, whereas D’Argembeau et al. (2012) demonstrated that
individual differences in the construction of ‘‘self-definingmemo-
ries’’—past events of great importance that shape an individual’s
sense of identity—are manifested similarly in the construction of
self-defining future projections, i.e., imagined future events with
great importance for self and identity. Brown et al. (2012) recently
reported that individuals who are led to believe that they can
cope effectively with stress (high ‘‘self-efficacy’’) remember
past events and imagine future events in greater episodic detail
than do individuals who are led to believe that they have difficul-
ties coping with stress (low self-efficacy). Anderson et al. (2012)
showed that remembering the past and imagining the future
depend similarly on distinct retrieval pathways, one character-
ized as ‘‘direct’’ or automatic and the other characterized as
‘‘controlled’’ or effortful. Spreng and Levine (2006; see also
Spreng and Levine, 2012) reported similarities in the temporal
distributions of past and future autobiographical events provided
by college students, middle-aged, and older adults. Several
studies have found that the developmental trajectories of report-
ing and making judgments about past and future events are
similar, as children become able to answer questions about their
own personal past and future between the ages of three and five
years (Busby and Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne and Imuta, 2011;
Hudson et al., 2011; Russell et al., 2010; Suddendorf, 2010b;
for review, see Suddendorf, 2010a). These findings are comple-
mented by a recent report indicating that some measures of
functional connectivity within the default network in children
and adolescents are related to the qualitative features of memo-
ries and to some extent future imaginations (Østby et al., 2012).
Studies using the Autobiographical Interview procedure (Lev-
ine et al., 2002) discussed earlier have documented that older
adults produce fewer internal or episodic details than younger
adults both when remembering the past and imagining the
future, along with an increased number of external details for
both remembering and imagining (Addis et al., 2008, 2010,
2011b; Gaesser et al., 2011; Sheldon et al., 2011; for review,
see Schacter et al., 2012). Similarly, studies of various neurolog-
ical and psychopathological populations have documented
parallel reductions in the episodic specificity of past and future
events in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Addis et al.,
Neuron
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amnesic syndrome (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis et al.,
2007b; Klein et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011; Tulving, 1985),
depression (Williams et al., 1996), schizophrenia (D’Argembeau
et al., 2008a), autism (Lind and Bowler, 2010), and post-trau-
matic stress disorder (Brown et al., 2011).
These converging findings have led investigators to propose
theoretical ideas that emphasize the tight links between memory
and simulation. For instance, Schacter and Addis (2007a, 2007b,
2009) proposed the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis,
which connects work on future simulation with ‘‘constructive’’
aspects of memory, such as memory distortions and errors, by
emphasizing memory’s role in simulating future events (for
related ideas, see Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Suddendorf
andCorballis, 1997). The general idea thatmemory is a construc-
tive process of integrating bits and pieces of information, rather
than a literal replay of the past, dates to the pioneering work of
Bartlett (1932), and has been developed by a variety of investiga-
tors who have demonstrated the occurrence of memory distor-
tions and theorized about their basis (e.g., Brainerd and Reyna,
2005; Johnson et al., 1993; Loftus, 1979, 2003; Schacter et al.,
1998; Schacter and Slotnick, 2004). A longstanding question
concerns whether the constructive nature of memory serves
any adaptive function (Bartlett, 1932; Hardt et al., 2010; Howe,
2011; Newman and Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, 2001; Schacter
et al., 2011). The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
states that a critical function of a constructive memory system
is to make information available in a flexible manner for simula-
tion of future events. Specifically, the hypothesis holds that
past and future events draw on similar information and rely on
similar underlying processes, and that the episodic memory
system supports the construction of future events by extracting
and recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel
event. While this adaptive function allows past information to
be used flexibly when simulating alternative future scenarios,
the flexibility of memory may also result in vulnerability to imag-
ination-induced memory errors, where imaginary events are
confused with actual events (for further discussion, see Schacter
et al., 2011; Schacter, 2012). Note that the constructive episodic
simulation hypothesis does not placemuch theoretical emphasis
on temporal processes such as mental time travel (Suddendorf
and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Tulving, 2002a, 2002b) but instead
emphasizes processes involved in linking together distinct
elements of an episode, in particular relational processing
capacities that have been linked with hippocampal function (Ei-
chenbaum and Cohen, 2001) and that may contribute to the
construction of simulated events.
Hassabis and Maguire (2007, 2009; see also Hassabis et al.,
2007a, 2007b; Summerfield et al., 2010) argued that a process
of ‘‘scene construction’’ is critically involved in both memory
and imagination. Scene construction entails retrieving and inte-
grating perceptual, semantic, and contextual information into
a coherent spatial context. Scene construction is held to be
more complex than ‘‘simple’’ visual imagery for individual
objects (Kosslyn et al., 2001) because it relies on binding
together disparate types of information into a coherent whole,
and likely involves processes mediated by several regions within
the default network, most notably themedial temporal lobe (Has-sabis et al., 2007a). Scene construction is thought to be a critical
component of both memory and imagination as mental simula-
tions, whether of the past, future or purely fictional, because
they are all usually framed within a spatial context (Hassabis
and Maguire, 2007). Buckner and Carroll (2007) contended that
the default network underpins ‘‘self-projection’’ processes by
which past experiences are used to imagine perspectives and
events beyond those in the immediate environment. In addition
to the default network’s role in remembering the past and imag-
ining the future, they argued that it serves an even more general
function, extending to diverse tasks that require mental simula-
tion of alternative perspectives, such as thinking about the
mental states of others (but see Rosenbaum et al., 2007). This
perspective places emphasis on attempting to understand
what is common to the various capacities that are linked to the
default network (i.e., self projection), and as noted earlier,
conceives of mental time travel as just one form of disengaging
from the immediate environment.
Evidence for Differences
A key point for the present purposes is that the above views and
related ideas (e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007) have
been formulated largely on the basis of evidence showing
commonalities between remembering the past and imagining
the future. However, it has become clear during the past few
years that these impressive similarities are accompanied by
important differences. Some such differences were reported in
the initial neuroimaging studies comparing past and future
events. For example, Okuda et al. (2003) and Addis et al.
(2007) both reported greater neural activity in frontopolar regions
and the hippocampus when participants imagined future events
compared with remembering past events. In the Addis et al.
(2007) study, participants pressed a button when they first
generated a past or future event in response to a word cue (the
‘‘construction’’ phase) and then mentally elaborated on the
generated events (the ‘‘elaboration’’ phase). Increased activity
for future events emerged primarily during the initial construction
phase, but a subsequent analysis of the elaboration phase data
(Addis and Schacter, 2008) revealed additional differences, most
notably in the hippocampal region. Addis and Schacter (2008)
analyzed the relation between neural activity and subjective
ratings that participants provided concerning the amount of
detail comprising past and future events. This analysis revealed
that activity in the left posterior hippocampus was associated
with the amount of detail comprising both past and future events,
whereas left anterior hippocampus responded selectively to the
amount of detail comprising future events.
Schacter and Addis (2007a, 2009) have attempted to accom-
modate such differences in discussions of the constructive
episodic simulation hypothesis, proposing that the finding of
greater neural activity for future relative to past events reflects
the more extensive constructive processes required by imag-
ining future events relative to remembering past events. That
is, whereas both past and future event tasks require the retrieval
of information from memory, imagining future experiences—but
not remembering past experiences—requires that details ex-
tracted from past experiences are flexibly recombined into
a novel event. More recently, additional factors have been sug-
gested as explaining the increased hippocampal activation forNeuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 681
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requires the generation of new mental representations, resulting
in a greater degree of encoding than that for previously stored
information (Martin et al., 2011). Moreover, the increased hippo-
campal activation for future relative to past events is only seen in
imagined future events that are specific (as opposed to general
or routine events), which has been proposed to reflect that highly
detailed and specific events require the formation of more novel
associations among the event details (Addis et al., 2011a).
Behavioral studies have also uncovered important differences.
Storm and Jobe (2012) reported that the phenomenon of
retrieval-induced forgetting—when retrieving information can
lead to impaired subsequent recall of related information—
occurs when retrieving actual autobiographical memories, but
not when retrieving imagined future (or imagined past)
experiences. Several behavioral studies have revealed that
remembered events are associated with greater retrieval of
sensory-perceptual details than are imagined future events
(D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004; Berntsen and Bohn,
2010; Gamboz et al., 2010a; McDonough and Gallo, 2010) or
imagined events in general (Johnson et al., 1988), whereas
imagined future events (or imagined events in general) are
more difficult to generate than remembered events and hence
are associated with more extensive cognitive operations (D’Ar-
gembeau and Van der Linden, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988;McDo-
nough and Gallo, 2010). Along similar lines, Anderson and
Dewhurst (2009) reported that imagined future experiences
contain less specific information than do remembered past
experiences. Evidence from the Autobiographical Interview like-
wise indicates that remembered past events contain more
internal or episodic details than do imagined future events (Addis
et al., 2008, 2010) or imagined past events (Addis et al., 2010; De
Brigard and Giovanello, 2012).
Related fMRI evidence comes from a study by Addis et al.
(2009a) in which participants remembered person-location-
object memories and also imagined events that might occur in
the future, or might have occurred in the past, that consisted
of person-location-object scenarios recombined from actual
memories. All three conditions were associated with activity in
the default network, but differences were also observed: activity
in posterior visual cortices such as fusiform, lingual and occipital
gyri and cuneus, as well as parahippocampal gyrus and poste-
rior hippocampus, was preferentially associated with remem-
bering actual events as compared with imagining future or past
events. Addis et al. (2009a) suggested that the association of
posterior visual cortices with memory for actual experiences,
as distinct from imaginary experiences, reflects reactivation of
sensory-perceptual details during memory retrieval, which
recruits the neural regions involved in the original processing of
the remembered information. Importantly, the behavioral data
from this study revealed that remembered events were rated
as more detailed than imagined events, whereas in the earlier
Addis et al. (2007) study that did not produce evidence of greater
activity for remembering the past compared with imagining the
future, level of rated detail for remembered and imagined events
was indistinguishable (see also, Hassabis et al., 2007a). None-
theless, some neural differences between past and future events
have been reported under conditions in whichmost phenomeno-682 Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.logical properties of past and future events did not differ,
including greater activations of visual regions for remembered
past events as compared with imagined future events (Weiler
et al., 2010a).
Greater activity for remembering the past relative to imagining
the future has also been demonstrated in the hippocampus
(Abraham et al., 2008a; Botzung et al., 2008, Weiler et al.,
2010b). The paradigms in these studies share a common feature:
the future events were preimagined prior to scanning, and
therefore during the fMRI paradigm, participants were not con-
structing a novel future event, but instead reimagining the
scenario. There is evidence to suggest that simulation-related
activity in the hippocampus reduces with repeated simulation
of future events (V. van Mulukom, D.L.S., M. Corballis, and
D.R.A., unpublished data; for related evidence from studies of
memory, see Svoboda and Levine, 2009), possibly to a level
lower than that associated with remembering, which would
result in a past greater than future effect. Another possibility is
that when future events are preimagined (and then reimagined
in the scanner), the participants are remembering a representa-
tion of the future simulation that, as noted earlier, is typically less
detailed relative to previously experienced events.
Complementing the above data, recent neuropsychological
studies of lesion patients also provide evidence for differences
between remembering the past and imagining the future. Berry-
hill et al. (2010) examined the autobiographical memory of two
patients with bilateral posterior parietal lesions and five patients
with assorted unilateral prefrontal lesions using the Autobio-
graphical Interview (Levine et al., 2002) and a ‘‘constructed
experiences’’ task based on previous work by Hassabis et al.
(2007a, 2007b), in which patients were asked to imagine ficti-
tious scenes (‘‘Imagine yourself in a museum’’) or self-relevant
future events (‘‘Imagine the next holiday’’). The parietal lesion
patients showed impaired performance on both the memory
and constructed experience tasks (e.g., they generated fewer
specific details than did controls), whereas the prefrontal lesion
patients were impaired on the constructed experience task but
not on the autobiographical memory task. Related to these find-
ings, in the de Vito et al. (2012b) study of patients with Parkin-
son’s disease noted earlier, it was found that Parkinson’s
patients showed a significant reduction in internal or episodic
details when imagining future events but not when remembering
past events (as noted earlier, these same patients failed to show
a deficit in atemporal imagining) and that the deficit was related
to performance on tests assessing frontal lobe function.
Several other recent patient studies provide further evidence
that remembering the past and imagining the future can be
dissociated. Semantic dementia patients, who have severe defi-
cits in semantic memory with relative preservation of episodic
memory consequent to atrophy of the anterior temporal lobes,
showed a reduction relative to controls in internal (episodic)
details on the Autobiographical Interview when imagining the
future, together with a preserved ability to generate internal
details when remembering the past (Irish, et al., 2012; see
Figure 2). Based on these findings, Irish et al. (2012) argued
that simulating novel future events, in contrast to remembering
past events, relies on general conceptual knowledge that
provides a ‘‘scaffolding into which specific episodic details can
Figure 2. Patients with Semantic Dementia
Show a Selective Deficit for Imagining
Future Events while Displaying Intact
Episodic Memory
The difference in the number of internal episodic
details generated for past and future events is
plotted for healthy controls and semantic
dementia patients; this difference is larger for the
patients than controls. Error bars are 95% confi-
dence intervals. Voxel-based morphometry anal-
yses indicate that this deficit in episodic future
thinking is related to changes in gray matter
intensity in the left inferior temporal gyrus and right
temporal pole. Clusters are shown at a threshold
of p < 0.001 and overlaid on the Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute standard brain. Adapted from Irish
et al. (2012).
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Duval et al. (2012) also reported that semantic dementia patients
exhibited impaired episodic future thinking despite intact
episodic recall. Weiler et al. (2011) reported a similar pattern in
two patients with thalamic lesions, who exhibited intact episodic
memory together with an impaired ability to imagine fictitious
and impersonal events and a somewhat milder deficit in imag-
ining personal future events.
Finally, although we noted earlier that a number of studies of
amnesic patients have revealed parallel deficits in remembering
the past and imagining the future or imagining novel scenes or
events (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Klein
et al., 2002; Race et al., 2011; Romero and Moscovitch, 2012;
Tulving, 1985), not all such studies show this effect. For example,
in a study that used the Autobiographical Interview as well as
measures of scene construction based on prior work by Hassa-
bis et al. (2007b), Squire et al. (2010) reported that amnesic
patients with damage to the hippocampus showed an intact
ability to create detailed imaginary future events and suggested
that findings of imagination impairments in previous cases reflect
the presence of extra-hippocampal damage (for further discus-
sion of this point, see Maguire and Hassabis, 2011; Squire
et al., 2011). However, the hippocampal patients in the Squire
et al. (2010) study exhibited only mild levels of retrograde
amnesia; they were able to retrieve events from the remote
past normally and showed only a mild, nonsignificant deficit for
retrieving memories from the recent past. Thus, as noted by Ad-
dis and Schacter (2012), the results of this study could also be
interpreted as support for the idea that a relatively intact ability
to retrieve much of the past can provide a basis for imagining
the future, even when the hippocampus is damaged. Squire
et al. (2010) also reported that the severely amnesic patient
E.P., who is characterized by extensive medial temporal lobe
damage, showed an intact ability to imagine future events.
However, although E.P. showed impaired recent autobiograph-
ical memory, he exhibited intact remote autobiographical
memory, perhaps contributing to his ability to imagine future
personal experiences.
Several other cases have been reported in which hippocampal
damage significantly impaired remembering but not imagining.
For instance, Maguire and colleagues reported that adult
amnesic patients who had sustained hippocampal damage early
in life are able to construct imaginary scenarios (Maguire et al.,2010; Hurley et al., 2011; but see, Kwan et al., 2010), and they
also report normal imagination abilities in children with hippo-
campal damage and autobiographical memory deficits (Cooper
et al., 2011). These findings suggest that the time of onset of the
amnesia could be an important factor: perhaps patients who
suffer early damage develop other strategies or rely either on
residual episodic memories or detailed semantic information to
construct imaginary scenarios (Cooper et al., 2011). Note also
that although Hassabis et al. (2007b) reported that four adult
amnesic patients had severe difficulties imagining scenarios,
they did report that one adult amnesic could perform their scene
construction task normally. They observed that this patient is
characterized by the presence of residual right hippocampal
tissue, and have recently reported fMRI evidence showing acti-
vation of the right hippocampus when the patient performed
a scene construction task (Mullally et al., 2012; see also, Maguire
et al., 2010). Overall, it seems clear that there are some cases in
which hippocampal damage differentially affects memory and
imagination, but it is not yet well understood why differential
effects are observed in some cases while parallel effects are
observed in others.
At a more general level, given that both cognitive and neural
differences between remembering and imagining have been es-
tablished, it will be important for theoretical accounts to attempt
to explain these differences. Ideas such as scene construction
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, 2009) and self-projection (Buck-
ner and Carroll, 2007) have focused on explaining what is
common to remembering, imagining, and related processes.
We noted earlier that the constructive episodic simulation
hypothesis (Schacter and Addis, 2007a, 2007b, 2009) addresses
some of the differences that have been documented (see also
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), but developing more detailed
theoretical accounts aimed at handling the differences between
remembering and imagining reviewed in this section constitutes
a critical task.
Neuroimaging and Cognitive Studies Are Beginning to
Reveal the Component Structures and Processes that
Support Memory-Based Simulations
Demonstrations that similarities between remembering the past
and imagining the future reflect the operation of a common
network have led investigators to ask questions concerning the
role played by specific regions within the network in bothNeuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 683
Figure 3. Two Components of the Default
Network
(A) A selection of sagittal, coronal, and axial views
of the ‘‘scene construction’’ subnetwork overlaid
on ‘‘glass brain’’ and structural images (p < 0.001).
This network includes the hippocampus, para-
hippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial and posterior
parietal cortices, and medial PFC and supports
the generation and maintenance of a complex and
coherent scene or event.
(B) Real memories are usually more self-relevant
and familiar than imagined experiences. When
these two types of simulation were directly con-
trasted in a well-controlled fMRI paradigm the
precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and ante-
rior medial PFC were found to be preferentially
engaged for real memories (see also D’Argem-
beau et al., 2010b). This network is often referred
to as the ‘‘self-reflection’’ network (Johnson et al.,
2002). Adapted from Hassabis et al. (2007a).
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ported by individual default network structures?
To test hypotheses concerning the roles of particular struc-
tures in component processes relevant to remembering and
imagining, it is important to construct experimental designs
that allow controlled manipulation of theoretically relevant task
features. A study by Hassabis et al. (2007a) attempted to accom-
plish this objective. Participants were instructed either to
construct fictitious experiences for the first time during fMRI684 Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.scanning (e.g., imagining lying on a sandy
beach), retrieve similar kinds of fictitious
experiences that had been constructed
a week prior to scanning, or recall recent
episodic memories of actual experi-
ences. All of these conditions were
compared with a control condition
involving imagining or recalling individual
objects (as opposed to coherent scenes).
Hassabis et al. (2007a) reasoned that
regions activated similarly during all three
experimental conditions relative to the
control task are involved in the process
of scene construction, whereas regions
that were selectively active during recall
of real autobiographical experiences are
specifically related to episodic memory,
above and beyond scene construction.
Construction of novel scenes engaged
a network that included hippocampus,
parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial
cortex and posterior parietal cortices,
and these regions were all similarly active
during recall of previously imagined
scenes and recall of episodic memories
(Figure 3A). By contrast, retrieving epi-
sodic memories of actual experiences,
relative to the other two conditions, was
associated with activity in anterior medialprefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate (Figure 3B), which the
authors linked with processes that support self-relevant pro-
cessing (e.g., Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Kelley et al.,
2002) and perhaps mental time travel (e.g., Tulving, 2002a).
Consistent with these observations, Andrews-Hanna et al.
(2010b) used both resting state measures of intrinsic connec-
tivity and experimental manipulations to provide evidence for
dissociable components of the default network. Intrinsic
connectivity measures revealed a distinction between a dorsal
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Reviewmedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) subsystem comprised of the
dMPFC, lateral temporal cortex, temporoparietal junction, and
temporal pole, and a medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem,
comprised of the ventral MPFC, hippocampal formation, para-
hippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and posterior inferior
parietal lobule. Both subsystems were tightly connected to
‘‘hub’’ regions including anterior MPFC and posterior cingulate.
Importantly, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) provided converging
evidence from task-based fMRI experiments that revealed func-
tional characteristics of the two subsystems. The MTL
subsystemwas associatedwithmemory-based scene construc-
tion when participants imagined future scenarios, whereas the
dMPFC subsystem was preferentially linked with affective,
self-referential activity as participants reflected on their current
mental states. Likewise, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b) found
evidence for a link between the anterior MPFC and posterior
cingulate ‘‘hub’’ regions and affective self-referential processes,
generally in line with the findings from Hassabis et al. (2007a).
These and related broad divisions between subsystems of the
default network (see Addis et al., 2009a; Kim, 2012) should
provide a basis for further refining our understanding of the
contributions of individual regions within these subsystems.
Several studies have already made progress in this regard. For
example, Szpunar et al. (2009) manipulated the contextual famil-
iarity of remembered and imagined scenarios. During fMRI scan-
ning, participants remembered past events or imagined future
events set in familiar contexts (e.g., their apartment). In addition,
participants also imagined future events set in unfamiliar
contexts (e.g., a jungle). Based on previous research discussed
earlier (Szpunar et al., 2007), Szpunar et al. (2009) hypothesized
that several posterior cortical regions, including parahippocam-
pal cortex and posterior cingulate, would exhibit increased
activity for familiar past and future settings, compared with unfa-
miliar future settings, and their results supported this hypothesis.
Szpunar et al. (2009) interpreted these findings in light of work by
Bar and colleagues (e.g., Bar and Aminoff, 2003; Bar, 2007)
showing that both of these regions play a role in generating
contextual associations based on past experience, which is
important for both remembering the past and imagining the
future.
D’Argembeau et al. (2010b) focused on the self-referential
aspect of episodic future thinking by using fMRI to examine brain
activity when participants simulated future episodes that were
related to their personal goals (e.g., moving into a new apartment
in 2 months, getting married next summer) versus future events
that were plausible and could be easily imagined, but were not
related to the individual’s personal goals (e.g., buying a clock
at the flea market in 2 months, taking a pottery lesson next
summer). Each of these tasks was compared with a control
condition in which participants imagined routine activities (e.g.,
taking a shower, commuting to school). D’Argembeau et al.
(2010b) found that the act of imagining scenarios related to
personal goals was associated with increased activity in ventral
MPFC and posterior cingulate relative to imagining nonpersonal
scenarios (see also Abraham et al., 2008a). Relating their find-
ings to previous work linking MPFC with the process of tagging
information as self-relevant (e.g., Gusnard et al., 2001; Schmitz
and Johnson, 2007; Northoff et al., 2006), the authors suggestedthat MPFC contributes to coding and evaluating the self-rele-
vance of future simulations with respect to personal goals. In
light of previous work discussed above linking the posterior
cingulate to contextual aspects of simulations, D’Argembeau
et al. (2010b) suggested that because scenarios involving
personal goals likely involve more familiar contexts than those
involving nonpersonal goals, posterior cingulate could
contribute to the contextualization of self-relevant simulations.
Another approach to identifying components of the default
network and their relation to specific features of future simula-
tions involves repetition-related reductions in neural activity,
known as repetition suppression or neural priming (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006; Schacter et al., 2007b). According to the logic of
repetition suppression, if a particular region is involved in the
initial processing of a specific feature of a simulation, then it
should show reduced activity when that feature is repeated. In
two recent experiments (K.K.S., P. St. Jacques, C. Robbins, G.
Wig, and D.L.S., unpublished data), participants either imagined
future social scenarios (e.g., interacting with a familiar person in
a familiar location) or future nonsocial scenarios (e.g., interacting
with a familiar object in a familiar location). The pattern of repe-
tition effects suggested that medial prefrontal, posterior cingu-
late, temporal-parietal, and middle temporal cortices are specif-
ically related to social scenarios, and also provided evidence
linking simulations of people with medial prefrontal cortex,
objects with inferior frontal and premotor cortices, and locations
with posterior cingulate/retrosplenial, parahippocampal, and
lateral parietal cortices.
These observations converge with data from another recent
study in which participants (1) imagined scenarios in which
they simulated the behavior of other people based on personality
characteristics they had learned about the protagonists, who
conformed to one of four different personality types, (2) imagined
themselves in the scenarios, or (3) simply imagined an empty
scene, i.e., a spatial context lacking people or events (D.H.,
R. Spreng, A. Rusu, C. Robbins, R. Mar, and D.L.S., unpublished
data). Compared with a control task in which participants
counted syllables in a text cue, all three imagination tasks
engaged the default network. Comparing common activity in
the protagonist and self conditions with the empty scene condi-
tions revealed increased activity in several regions previously
implicated in processing of social scenarios, including dorsal
and anteriorMPFC, anterior temporal lobes, and posterior cingu-
late. A further analysis using multivariate pattern classification
methods addressed the question of where in the brain person-
ality characteristics of the protagonists are represented,
revealing that anterior and dorsal MPFC reliably discriminated
among the four protagonists.
Overall, the studies reviewed in this section suggest a broad
consensus emerging around the idea that regions including
MPFC and posterior cingulate are differentially involved with
self and social aspects of simulation, whereas regions including
medial temporal lobe and retrosplenial cortex are differentially
involved in memory-based scene construction.
There is less consensus, however, concerning the precise role
of the hippocampus in imagination and future thinking (for recent
reviews, see Addis and Schacter, 2012; Buckner, 2010; Hassa-
bis and Maguire, 2007, 2009; Schacter and Addis, 2009; ViardNeuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 685
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studies have revealed a variety of patterns, where hippocampal
activity has been similarly related to remembering and imagining,
greater for imagining than remembering, or greater for remem-
bering than imagining. A recent activation likelihood estimation
(ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies that have examined
medial temporal lobe activity during remembering and imagining
tasks suggests that such details as type of cue, task, and spec-
ificity of the retrieved information can all influence the precise
location and pattern of activity in the hippocampus and other
medial temporal lobe structures (Viard et al., 2012). Moreover,
lesion studies have provided contrasting evidence regarding
the question of whether hippocampal damage alone is sufficient
to produce a deficit in future simulation or imagining novel
scenes. Addis and Schacter (2012) suggested that three
different simulation-related processes rely to some extent on
the hippocampus: (1) providing access to details stored in
memory that are relevant to a constructed scenario, (2) recom-
bining these details into a spatiotemporal context, and (3) encod-
ing a simulation into memory so that it can influence and guide
future behaviors. Addis and Schacter (2012) further noted that
these processes might depend on regional differences within
the hippocampus, which could also be relevant to some of the
inconsistencies noted in the literature.
Much remains to be done to clarify the role of the hippocampus
and other structures in imagination and future simulation. It will
be important for this neurally focused work to take account of
behavioral studies that are beginning to tease apart the corre-
sponding cognitive components of memory and simulation,
some of which we have already discussed in this review (for
recent examples, see Anderson, 2012; Anderson et al., 2012; Ar-
nold et al., 2011a; D’Argembeau and Mathy, 2011; de Vito et al.,
2012a; Pillemer et al., 2012; Szpunar and McDermott, 2008).
The Default Network Can Couple Flexibly with Other
Networks to Support Complex Goal-Directed
Simulations
We have emphasized that the network of regions activated
during remembering the past and imagining the future overlaps
considerably with the default network and also noted that the
default network was initially identified by deactivations during
externally directed attention to visually presented stimuli
compared with passive resting states (Raichle et al., 2001).
This latter observation led investigators to suggest that the
default network does not contribute to goal-directed cognitive
processing and that its activity might even be antithetical to
goal-directed cognition (e.g., Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010;
Park et al., 2010; Thomason et al., 2008). In line with these obser-
vations, Mason et al. (2007) reported fMRI evidence that default
network activity showed significant increases as participants
performed highly practicedworkingmemory tasks characterized
by frequent incidents of mind-wandering relative to novel task
conditions. Increased activity in several default network regions
during practiced (versus novel) tasks was positively correlated
with self-reported tendencies to mind-wander. The finding that
default network activity increased as participants mentally
wandered ‘‘off task’’ supports the idea that this network does
not and perhaps cannot support goal-directed cognition. From686 Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.this perspective, the memories and future simulations associ-
ated with default network activity do not involve goal-directed
cognition and instead represent cognitive activity akin to mind-
wandering or daydreaming, consistent with the general notion
that the default network does not contribute to goal-directed
cognition.
Contrary to these ideas, recent evidence indicates that the
default network can support goal-directed simulations. As
already noted, default network activity has been reported when
participants make decisions about self-relevant future scenarios
that involved specific goals (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b; D’Ar-
gembeau et al., 2010b). Spreng et al. (2010) examined goal-
directed cognition by devising an autobiographical planning
task and compared activity during performance of a traditional
visuospatial planning task, the Tower of London (e.g., Shallice,
1982). In the latter task, participants were shown two configura-
tions of discs on vertical rods in an ‘‘initial’’ and ‘‘goal’’ position,
and they attempted to determine the minimum number of moves
needed to match the configurations. The autobiographical plan-
ning task was visually matched to the Tower of London task but
required participants to devise plans in order to meet specific
goals in their personal futures. For example, freedom from
debt constituted one of the goals in the autobiographical plan-
ning task. Participants viewed the goal and then saw two steps
they could take toward achieving that goal (good job and save
money) as well as an obstacle they needed to overcome in order
to achieve the goal (have fun). They were instructed to integrate
the steps and obstacles into a cohesive personal plan that would
allow them to achieve the goal.
Such goal-directed autobiographical planning engaged the
default network. As shown in Figure 4, during the autobiograph-
ical planning task activity in the default network coupled with
a distinct frontoparietal control network (e.g., Vincent et al.,
2008; Niendam et al., 2012) that has been linked to executive
control processes. By contrast, visuospatial planning during
the Tower of London task engaged a third network—the dorsal
attention network, which is known to increase its activity when
attention to the external environment is required (e.g., Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002)—that also coupled with the frontoparietal
control network. These results suggest that the default network
can support goal-directed cognition of a particular kind, autobio-
graphical planning, by cooperatingwith the frontoparietal control
network, which appears capable of flexibly coupling with distinct
networks depending on task demands. Spreng and Schacter
(2012) replicated these results in young adults and extended
them to older adults, also showing that during visuospatial plan-
ning, the elderly failed to suppress default network activity and
that default activity in the elderly did not decouple from the fron-
toparietal control network. Spreng et al. (2012) usedmeasures of
intrinsic functional connectivity and analyses based on graph
theory to examine further the relations among the default, fronto-
parietal control, and dorsal attention networks. Converging with
the results from task-based activation studies, Spreng et al.
(2012) reported that whereas the default and dorsal attention
networks exhibited little positive connectivity with one another,
the frontoparietal control network showed a high degree of
intrinsic connectivity with each of these networks (see also, Dou-
cet et al., 2011).
Figure 4. Network Coupling
(A) Intrinsic connectivitymaps depicting the default (blue), dorsal attention (red), and frontoparietal control (green) networks of the brain. Task-related BOLD signal
change during planning within each intrinsic connectivity network: (B) default network, (C) dorsal attention network, (D) frontoparietal control network (*significant
difference from baseline).
(E) Frontoparietal control network coupling is modulated by domain of planning task. Frontoparietal control network activity is coupled with the default network,
and decoupled from the dorsal attention network, during autobiographical planning. Frontoparietal control network activity is coupled with the dorsal attention
network, and decoupled from the default network, during visuospatial planning. Adapted from Spreng et al. (2010).
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fMRI scans while participants performed a goal-directed task in
which they generated mental simulations in order to solve
specific problems that arose in imaginary scenarios. For
example, participants were asked to imagine being left alone in
a friend’s dorm room, and trying on their friend’s ring, which
they could not remove. They received a cue word such as
‘‘soap’’ to help them imagine a solution to the problem. A
contrast of brain activity during this task with activity during
a semantic processing control task revealed that the simula-
tion-based problem-solving task engaged several key regions
within the default network, including medial prefrontal cortexand posterior cingulate, as well as a region of lateral prefrontal
cortex that has been linked with executive processing. These
key default and frontoparietal control structures behaved as
a functional network in a multivariate functional connectivity
analysis, coupling with regions in the default network including
the hippocampus (Gerlach et al., 2011).
Along similar lines, Ellamil et al. (2012) reported that when
participants evaluated creative ideas they had generated in the
scanner, default network regions coupled with executive
regions, including lateral prefrontal cortex. Two additional
studies demonstrated coactivation of the executive and default
systems in a manner consistent with cross-network coupling.Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 687
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while domain specific information modulated the default
network. Meyer at al. (2012) reported that medial prefrontal
and posterior cingulate activity was related tomeasures of social
competence and social reasoning during a social working
memory task, whereas lateral prefrontal activity increased as
a function of the amount of social information required to be
maintained. Summerfield et al. (2010) reported that regions
including hippocampus and retrosplenial cortex were involved
in integrating imagined objects into a scene, whereas activity
in lateral prefrontal regions was dependent on the number of
elements to be integrated.
Recent fMRI evidence also shows that both default network
and executive regions are coactive and coupled during memory
retrieval (Fornito et al., 2012; St Jacques et al., 2011) and mind-
wandering (Christoff, et al., 2009; Christoff, 2012). Further,
people typically focus on the future and engage in extensive
autobiographical planning during mind-wandering episodes
(Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, et al., 2011), and these effects
are most pronounced in individuals with high working memory
capacity, a measure of executive processing (Baird et al.,
2011). These observations provide further evidence that the
default network can couple with executive regions in the service
of goal-directed cognition (for further discussion, see Schacter,
2012; Smallwood et al., 2012; Spreng, 2012).
Concluding Comments and Future Directions
It should be clear from the material reviewed here that much has
been learned about the relations among memory, imagination,
and future thinking during the past several years. We conclude
by noting a number of other emerging issues that we think are
particularly suitable for additional study.
The tight linkage between remembering the past and imag-
ining the future has led several investigators to propose that
a key function of memory is to provide a basis for predicting
the future via imagined scenarios and that the ability to flexibly
recombine elements of past experience into simulations of novel
future events is therefore an adaptive process (e.g., Boyer, 2008;
Schacter and Addis, 2007a, 2007b; Suddendorf and Corballis,
1997, 2007). Although future simulations are subject to some
pitfalls (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Schacter, 2012), several lines
of research have begun to provide evidence for the functional-
adaptive role of future simulations, including work on default
network contributions to planning and problem solving dis-
cussed earlier (for review, see Schacter, 2012). An interesting
parallel has also appeared in the field of machine learning, where
significant advances have been made in planning through the
deployment of Monte Carlo tree search methods (e.g., Silver
and Veness, 2010). These techniques make use of simulations
of the future (‘‘rollouts’’) to better evaluate situations and aid
decision making, and have been successfully used in a gaming
context to train master level Computer Go programs (i.e.,
programs that play the board game Go).
Another promising direction involves the simulation of
emotional events and its relation to memory. It has been estab-
lished that the ability to generate specific and detailed simula-
tions of future events is associated with effective coping by
enhancing the ability of individuals to engage in emotional regu-688 Neuron 76, November 21, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.lation and appropriate problem-solving activities (Brown et al.,
2002; Sheldon et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 1998). Numerous studies
have also established that views of the future are associated with
a prevalent positivity or optimism bias (Sharot, 2011), and fMRI
evidence has linked this bias with reduced activity in brain
regions associated with emotion, such as the amygdala and
rostral anterior cingulate, during simulation of negative future
scenarios versus simulation of positive future scenarios or
memory for positive or negative past events (Sharot et al.,
2007). These findings fit well with behavioral research showing
a positivity bias when people remember simulations of positive,
negative, and neutral future events: details associated with
negative simulations are remembered more poorly over time
compared with details associated with positive or neutral simu-
lations (Szpunar et al., 2012; see also, Gallo et al., 2011).
Emotional factors also play a role in the well-established finding
that repeatedly simulating a future event makes that event seem
more probable (for review of early studies, see Koehler, 1991).
Szpunar and Schacter (2012) recently reported that after repeat-
edly simulating personal events that might occur in one’s future,
the subjective plausibility of those events increases, but the
effect was observed only for positive and negative events, and
not for neutral events. Research investigating the neural basis
of this cognitive bias could benefit from studies that have begun
to examine the neural underpinnings of emotional simulations
(e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2008b; Sharot et al., 2007).
Another promising domain centers on the phenomenon of
temporal discounting: people typically devalue a future reward
according to the extent of delay before the reward is delivered
(Green and Myerson, 2004). Boyer (2008) argued that a key
adaptive function of the ability to simulate future events based
on past experience is to allow individuals to represent emotional
aspects of future reward in a way that overrides temporal dis-
counting so as to produce less impulsive and more farsighted
decisions. Two recent studies have shown that when people
imagine experiencing a reward in the future, they show an
increased tendency to favor reward that produce greater long-
term payoffs, thereby countering the normal tendency to
devalue delayed reward (Benoit et al., 2011; Peters and Bu¨chel,
2010; for related results, see Mitchell et al., 2011). Moreover, the
results of fMRI scanning carried out during this procedure
showed that the effects of episodic simulation on temporal dis-
counting are associated with increased coupling between
activity in the hippocampus and prefrontal (Benoit et al., 2011)
or anterior cingulate (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010) regions involved
in reward-related processing. These findings could provide
a basis for investigating effects of simulation on discounting,
and its neural underpinnings, in populations prone to impulsive
decision making such as drug addicts (e.g., Bechara, 2005).
Importantly, Kwan et al. (2012) showed that the severely
amnesic patient KC, who is unable to recall specific episodes
from his personal past or imagine specific episodes in his
personal future (Tulving, 1985), did not exhibit more impulsive
decision-making than matched controls. The authors suggested
that KC relies on his intact semantic memory when making deci-
sions about the future. Clearly, developing a more complete
understanding of the separate and possibly interacting influ-
ences of episodic and semantic memory processes for
Neuron
Reviewfarsighted versus impulsive future decisions represents an
important avenue for future research.
These considerations also highlight the potentially important
contributions made by semantic memory to imagining the
future. We began this review by noting that we would focus
primarily on episodic memory, and though there is little doubt
that episodic memory plays a key role in imagining the future,
it is also clear that semantic memory is highly relevant (Klein,
2012; Martin-Ordas et al., 2012). For example, early work by
Klein et al. (2002) examined the role of semantic memory in
thinking about the future, and this link has been acknowledged
by a number of investigators (e.g., Abraham et al., 2008a; Binder
and Desai, 2011; Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012; Sudden-
dorf and Corballis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar,
2010). Several recent findings, in addition to the work by
Kwan et al. (2012) on temporal discounting, highlight ways in
which semantic memory can contribute to imagining future
episodes, including findings that (1) patients with impaired
semantic memory show a reduced ability to generate specific
future episodes (Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012) and also
show deficits in constructing semantic future scenarios (Duval
et al., 2012), (2) some default network regions are active during
both episodic and semantic future thinking tasks (Abraham
et al., 2008a), and (3) general or semantic personal knowledge
guides retrieval of episodic details during the construction
of future events in healthy individuals, providing a basis for
structuring and interpreting them (D’Argembeau and Mathy,
2011; D’Argembeau and Demblon, 2012). Taken together,
we think that these findings suggest that semantic memory
plays an important role in the process of recombination, which
has been emphasized as critical for constructing simulated
scenarios, and thus believe that an important task will be to
distinguish episodic and semantic contributions to the process
of recombination. While it has been suggested that future
thinking based on semantic memory may draw heavily on
lateral and anterior temporal lobe regions (e.g., Addis et al.,
2007, 2011b; Irish et al., 2012), more direct investigations are
needed.
Studies of remembering the past and imagining the future
should benefit from establishing closer connections with work
on narrative processing and the representation of nonpersonal
fictional information. For example, the severely amnesic patient
KCwho, as noted earlier, has essentially no capacity for episodic
memory or future simulation (Tulving, 1985) also exhibits deficits
when attempting to generate non-personal fictional narratives
(Rosenbaum et al., 2009). These findings are in line with fMRI
evidence from Abraham et al. (2008b), who found that medial
temporal lobe regions were active when participants made
possible/impossible judgments about scenarios involving real
people (e.g., Peter heard about George Bush on the radio
yesterday) or fictional characters (e.g., Peter heard about
Cinderella on the radio). A related line of evidence indicates
that correlated reductions in the episodic specificity of remem-
bering past events and imagining the future in older adults
extend to the description of perceptually present pictures
(Gaesser et al., 2011), perhaps involving age-related changes
in narrative processing (Labouvie-Vief and Blanchard-Fields,
1982; Trunk and Abrams, 2009), but much remains to be learnedabout the contribution of narrative processing to memory and
imagination (e.g., Abelson, 1981).
Finally, social and cognitive psychologists have done a great
deal of research on the topic of counterfactual simulations—
that is, constructing alternative versions of what could have
happened in the past (e.g., Byrne, 2002; Epstude and Roese,
2008)—but few studies have examined the neural basis of
such simulations (e.g., Barbey et al., 2009) or how they are
related to simulating future events (e.g., De Brigard et al.,
2013). Neuroimaging evidence reviewed earlier (Addis et al.,
2009a) indicates that many of the same regions are involved in
imagining future and imagining past events, and recent fMRI
evidence examining the construction of alternative outcomes
to past events also implicates many regions in the default
network (Van Hoeck et al., 2012). Additional studies on the topic
should be highly revealing.
At a more general level, research examining the relations
among memory, imagination and future thinking has helped to
broaden our conception of memory by bringing into focus the
numerous ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning
and by emphasizing the close link between memory and simula-
tion. We believe that many valuable insights remain to be gained
from further development of this promising approach.
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